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Explaining Asia's growth (Book review)

9/3/2014

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Within Asia, the north-eastern countries (Japan, Korea and Taiwan) have progressed much faster in the last 50 years than the south-eastern countries (Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia).

Would you believe that, in 1950, Philippines was richer than Korea and Taiwan? Or that there was hardly any difference between Taiwan, Korea, Indonesia and Thailand? Or that China was lagging Indonesia and Philippines? Here are their GDP per capita figures for 1950: Japan $1,873, Philippines $1,293, Taiwan $922, Korea $876, Indonesia $874, Thailand $848, China $614, India $597*. Today, Japan, Korea and Taiwan have all ascended to the developed country status, while Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand have been left behind. The question is why.

In his latest book, "How Asia Works", Joe Studwell tries to answer that question. He identifies a magic formula with three ingredients: land reforms; state-supported manufacturing development; and state-controlled  financial sector being harnessed to support manufacturing.

The first one, land reforms, consists of restructuring agriculture  into labor-intensive household farming, which maximizes agricultural productivity by making use of the excess labor available in the initial stages of development. This results in a surplus that creates demand for goods and services and sets the stage for the second initiative, development of state-supported manufacturing.

State-supported manufacturing means channeling investment towards manufacturing rather than other types of businesses. This creates productive jobs for workers with limited skills as they migrate out of agriculture. For this process to be successful, Studwell lays down two essential conditions: rapid learning of advanced manufacturing technologies and subjecting manufacturing to export discipline to make sure that only the globally competitive industries survive.

The third intervention is to control and harness the financial sector to provide the necessary capital for the agricultural and manufacturing development, rather than other types of businesses, including services and personal consumption. The financial sector could also be used as a tool to ensure export discipline for the manufacturing industries.

Well, that's it - the magic formula. Having explained this right upfront in the foreword, Studwell spends the rest of the book mainly presenting the historical evidence for his theory. Much of his evidence is anecdotal and historical; not much of statistical tables and charts, but a lot of narrative economic history. In between, the narrative is interspersed with his observations from his travels in some of the countries, in so far as they are related to his theory.

In general economic commentaries, we do not generally read much about state-directed manufacturing and finance as elements critical to economic development. Hence Studwell’s theory is an interesting one. But I could not help questioning it as I read along.

One issue is whether these historical lessons are still relevant. In other words, can the lesser-developed countries start implementing this formula today and achieve development? For instance, it can be argued that what is holding back India are misdirected and wasted subsidies, corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy and the plutocratic political class. For India, the solution has to start with dismantling the current economic and political structures rather than more state-directed support for selected manufacturing industries or state-directed lending for farming and manufacturing.

In many places, the book comes across like extolling central planning and state control. Studwell praises the economic model followed by Park Chung-hee, Korean dictator from 1961 until his assassination in 1979. It so happened that Park’s economic policies contained some of the positive elements such as manufacturing development, rapid technological acquisition and development of globally competitive industries, which helped Korea’s fast economic development. But central planning and government control over the economy can easily turn into crony capitalism, as it happened in Indonesia’s Suharto period or in India until the economic liberalization of 1991. Russia is another ongoing example of how state control has not managed to lay the foundations for sustained economic performance – the country remains sorely dependent on oil and gas revenues. The point is that, for every one successful state-directed economic development, there are myriad examples of misdirected, corrupt and failed attempts of state-directed economy.

It is not clear to what extent Studwell’s model applies to China’s incredible rise in the last four decades. While China has followed the export-led growth model and turned itself into the world’s factory, it has yet to prove its ability to acquire and develop advanced technologies. Although Studwell provides some figures about the growth in the total profits earned by state-owned firms, there is a lot of other evidence that their return on capital invested is much lower than that achieved by private firms. It is then no wonder that China's incremental capital-output ratio has been rising. China today stands at a crossroads, when it needs to shift from export-and-investment-led growth to domestic-and-consumption-led growth.

A good question may be worth more than one good answer. As such, books should not be judged solely by their ability to provide answers. In that sense, Studwell’s book provokes many interesting questions. For example, how is India going to achieve economic prosperity and provide jobs to its expanding young population without developing its manufacturing sector? Its vaunted information technology sector has created 3m direct jobs, hardly enough to scratch the surface, leave alone making a dent in the country’s employment levels. While Indonesia has ridden the commodity boom for the last 10 years, how is it going to climb further without a coherent competitive strategy? Malaysia has got stuck in the middle-income trap without a clear strategy of how to develop further.

As Studwell points out, the economic profession seems to have adopted the mantra of free market, the government’s role being only to build the infrastructure, provide the legal and institutional framework and set the monetary policy, leaving the manufacturing and services sectors to decide their growth strategies. This book raises interesting questions about whether
governments should legitimately play a more interventionist role in fostering development.

I had immensely enjoyed Studwell’s earlier book, “Asian Godfathers”. It was a riot of a read about Asia’s business tycoons and their escapades, although with a solid message about how they had cornered the economic systems to their own advantage. “How Asia Works”, on the other hand, is much more of a slow and difficult read.

* "All countries compared for Economy> GDP per capita in 1950, Angus Maddison. Aggregates compiled by NationMaster." 1950. 
< http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Economy/GDP-per-capita-in-1950>.


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Unravelling the spaghetti: India and its future - Part 1 (Book review)

29/4/2013

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Many times, I have felt that India is like a bowl of spaghetti. In such a diverse country with so many things going on at any time, it is difficult to sort out the issues and make sense of what needs to be done.

In the book, “Imagining India”, Nandan Nilekani (co-founder and ex-CEO of Infosys and the current head of the national identity card project) tries to view the country in terms of the ideas that define it. He sorts them into four categories: ideas that have been accepted in the society; those that are under progress; those about which there is still considerable debate and disagreement; and those that will be relevant for the future, but are not receiving the attention they deserve.

As I kept reading the book, I found myself arguing with the author. While I had my  preconceptions, I also found myself learning many new facts about India. Nilekani's understanding of the country is impressive, and his arguments are supported by well-researched data and statistics. As a co-founder of Infosys and one of the corporate leaders of India, he has had tremendous access to other leaders: finance ministers, Nobel Prize winners, economists, social workers, historians, and even a foreign country's prime minister.

This book is a "must-read" for anyone interested in understanding today's India and its future. It is the most balanced of the three books that I read recently about India, the other two being "India: The Emerging Giant" by Arvind Panagariya and "The Indian Renaissance: India's Rise after a Thousand Years of Decline" by Sanjeev Sanyal. Panagariya's book is packed with facts and figures, but much of it historical; Sanyal's book is good, good but does not address the challenges deeply. Nilekani's book not only discusses the issues deeply, but provides enough facts to support the arguments.

Accepted Ideas

Nilekani starts the first section with the argument that India has finally started viewing its people as assets rather than liabilities. He cites the now-famous concept of demographic dividend as the foundation of India's future. Of course, having led Infosys for many years, Nilekani cites the IT and BPO sectors as evidence of the positive role that a well-educated population could play. But as I read the chapter, I kept wondering if his views were not tainted by his IT  experience. For instance, he does mention the fact that the southern states have  crossed their peak period of demographic dividend, while the population of the lower-developed BIMARU (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh) states are still growing and getting younger. But he does not discuss the implications of this split fully. Unless the BIMARU states manage to develop, and that too at a rapid pace, the population profile of those states may become a curse, and the current regional imbalances may intensify and lead to social problems.

Besides, how can one conclude that the human population of India has become its asset, when over 60% of the population still depends on agriculture for a living, and even in that sector, the labor productivity is very poor? Whether India's young demographic profile may turn into a blessing or a curse depends on how well other areas of the economy are reformed to produce the growth and jobs necessary to satisfy the people. And that is where Nilekani's other ideas become relevant.

Nilekani next discusses the acceptance of entrepreneurs in the society. He traces the dominating influence of Nehru's socialist policies on India's early economic path as an independent country, and their failure to produce sustainable growth. He then goes on to discuss the Bombay Plan devised by the industrialists as a compromise to the fiercely socialist government, and describes the eventual rise of the entrepreneur after Manmohan Singh's 1991 liberalization. As I read the chapter, I could not but feel angry and disappointed at the missed economic opportunities, thanks to the failed Nehruvian policies. I also remembered the futile rules that curtailed production of various products, even as demand was booming. (My father wanted to buy a Bajaj scooter in 1987 and found that he had to place a deposit and wait for three years for his turn to buy one; so he  eventually bought one in the black market by paying a premium of about 25% of the actual cost, and had to run the scooter in someone else's name for a year before it could be transferred to his name!).

The overall thrust of the argument that private enterprise is now encouraged is fine, but it is difficult to agree with Nilekani when he says that the ineffectual economic policies are what bought the Congress down finally and led to the rise of multi-party democracy. In fact, in many other parts of the book, he does a masterly job of describing the rise of multiple identities that led to a regional and multi-party political system.

The other problem with this chapter, and indeed the whole book, is that Nilekani scarcely mentions the role of corruption in holding down India's development. There is no doubt that the nexus between the politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen twisted the system to their benefit rather than that of the common people. This omission also made me think about Dhirubhai Ambani, who had brilliant ideas about business (in particular, his conviction to build world-scale capacities and his use of capital markets), but who nevertheless manipulated the system to his unashamed advantage, including blatant scandals such as smuggling and duplicate share certificates. But now, there is even a book on “Ambanism” as if it is a legitimate economic philosophy!

The next accepted idea that Nilekani talks about is the growing use of English across the country and its almost universal acceptance by politicians. No disputes on this point, happily! It reminded me of a discussion in my business school about what unites India. After considering different ideas, we settled upon commerce and business that keeps India united. English is, of course, the glue that links Indians and keeps the commerce flowing.

Next to come is IT, Nilekani's home subject. His description of how Rajiv Chawla, a cunning bureaucrat, slipped computerization quietly into the land records system of Karnataka is hilarious. The government workers had not realized what was going on, and by the time they woke up, it had been done! It is indeed heartening to see IT being used in many key private sectors, such as banking, railways and insurance, and it is seeping into core government services.

When Nilekani talks about globalization as an accepted idea, he again falls back on IT as the main example. While that is indisputable, there is much work to be done to reap the benefits of globalization in the manufacturing, agriculture and financial sectors. There are good examples of some Indian manufacturing companies benefiting from access to global markets, but what has been achieved falls far short of the overall potential of the country. I am also not sure how Indian agriculture would react to globalization in terms of input and output pricing, as well as product choice. For instance, what kind of crops might be produced if all input and output are priced at international levels? Or, what kind of agricultural imports and exports might take place? Will Indian agriculture benefit from globalization without first eliminating the structural inefficiencies such as small farm holdings and land ceiling legislations? These are complex questions, but Nilekani does not carry the argument about agricultural globalization to its logical end. While he has covered so many important aspects in the book, I wish he had discussed the agricultural sector more thoroughly, instead of just mentioning it in passing in different contexts.

Nilekani's final accepted idea is democracy, and it is also one which I found most difficult to digest. For all its positives and ills, democracy is an idea that has finally been accepted in India as the political system of choice. Nilekani has provided a good description of the rise of regional parties and factions, but it is not clear what his judgment is about the phenomenon: is he just describing, bemoaning or celebrating? He argues that the caste, language and regional identities grew in prominence due to the failure of the state to provide  broad-based growth. The question is not whether India has accepted democracy, but whether the current form of democracy is not turning into kleptocracy.

He believes that the new identities are coalescing into an Indian identity, but in my view, he is treading on thin ice when he says that. On the other hand, I feel that the multi-identity democracy is serving to hinder progress rather than enable it; and whatever progress is achieved is in spite of it rather than due to it. After all, how many regional parties have an overarching view of Indian progress and society? How many of them function on the basis of any principle, except that of taking care of their own supporters and constituents? At the extreme instances, when I think about the unprincipled bargaining between different parties, I only get the image of hyenas tearing at the prey from different directions, getting their fill of the meat. Finally, even Nilekani is forced to acknowledge the inescapable, but he still gives it a positive spin when he says, “this period of stonewalling, backtracking and accommodation is essential ... it is the only way we can frame policies that are truly sustainable.” It is a shame that even after 60 years of independence, a discerning writer like Nilekani has to call India's democracy young in trying to justify what is happening.

... Click here to read Part 2.
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